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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
The issue on appeal is whether certain Pennsylvania 
prevailing wage and apprenticeship requirements are 
preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461. Since oral 
argument, the same issue was addressed by the United 
States Supreme Court in California Div. of Labor Standards 
Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction, N.A., Inc., 117 S. 
Ct. 832 (1997). Accordingly, we hold ERISA does not 
preempt Pennsylvania's prevailing wage and apprenticeship 
requirements insofar as they restrict the payment of 
apprentice wages to apprentices registered in approved 






In 1961, Pennsylvania adopted the Prevailing Wage Act, 
which provides that "[n]ot less than the prevailing 
minimum wages . . . shall be paid to all workmen employed 
on public work." 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 165-5. The purpose of 
the Act was "to protect workers employed on public projects 
from substandard wages by insuring that they receive the 
prevailing minimum wage." Keystone Chapter, Associated 
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Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. Foley, 37 F.3d 945, 950 
(3d Cir. 1994)(quoting Lycoming County Nursing Home 
Assoc., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 627 A.2d 238, 242 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1993)), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1393 (1995). 
The prevailing minimum wage is determined by the 
Secretary of Labor and Industry,1 who also investigates 
charges of wage act violations. 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 165-7, 
165-11. An intentional violation of the wage act results in 
the contractor's bar from public contracts for three years. 
43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 165-11(e). The contractor may also be 
liable to the Commonwealth for damages for underpayment 
of wages due under the contract. 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 165- 
11(f). 
 
Pennsylvania law permits an exception to the mandatory 
prevailing wage rate for apprentices in approved 
apprenticeship programs. The Pennsylvania Apprenticeship 
and Training Act permits the payment of "apprentice wage 
rates" which may be lower than the prevailing rate 
minimums. 34 Pa. Code § 83.5(b)(5)(i) ("The progressively 
increasing schedule of apprentice wage rates shall be 
expressed in terms of percentages of the journeyperson 
hourly rate.").2 To prevent abuses of the apprenticeship 
system, the Pennsylvania Apprenticeship and Training Act 
created a State Apprenticeship and Training Council to set 
standards for apprenticeship programs.3  43 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§§ 90.3, 90.4. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The prevailing minimum wage varies depending on the "locality in 
which the public work is to be performed" and the "craft or classification 
of all workmen needed to perform public work contracts." 43 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 165-7. 
 
2. The regulations accompanying the Prevailing Wage Act specifically 
allow for the hiring of apprentices on public works projects. 34 Pa. Code 
§ 9.103(9) ("[A]pprentices shall be limited to numbers in accordance with 
a bona fide apprenticeship program registered with and approved by The 
Pennsylvania Apprenticeship and Training Council . .. ."). 
 
3. The Apprenticeship and Training Council is a State Apprenticeship 
Agency empowered to regulate apprenticeship programs under federal 
law. See 29 C.F.R. § 29.3(a) (1996). The Council approves only those 
apprenticeship programs which are "organized, written plan[s]" providing 
for the "employment and training of the apprentice in a skilled trade," 
"instruction in technical subjects related to the trade," and a 
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B. 
 
Ferguson Electric Company contracted with the 
Schuylkill County Redevelopment Authority to provide 
electrical work for a public works project. Ferguson used 
nonunion labor and enrolled its apprentices in an 
apprenticeship program sponsored by the Keystone Chapter 
of the Associated Builders and Contractors, an employer's 
association. Ferguson is a member of the Associated 
Builders and Contractors, and its apprenticeship program 
had been approved by the Apprenticeship and Training 
Council. After Ferguson submitted apprenticeship 
agreements to the Council for approval in June 1992, its 
apprentices started working for apprentice wages. But the 
Council did not approve the agreements until January 
1993. 
 
Because Ferguson started paying apprentice wages prior 
to receiving Council approval, the Pennsylvania Department 
of Labor and Industry asked the Schuylkill County 
Redevelopment Authority to withhold its invoice payments. 
Then, in April 1993, the Department initiated an 
administrative proceeding against Ferguson under the 
Prevailing Wage Act for: (1) paying apprentice wages to 
employees before receiving Council approval; and (2) 
employing too many apprentices in violation of a state job- 
site apprentice-to-journeyman ratio rule. The Department 
sought monetary penalties and a ban on Ferguson's 
participation in public works projects for three years. 
 
Denying any violation, Ferguson brought this federal 
action alleging the state officials colluded with the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
"progressively increasing schedule" of wages. 34 Pa. Code § 83.5(a),(b)(1), 
(b)(4),(b)(5). Apprenticeship programs must limit the "ratio of apprentices 
to journeymen [to] be consistent with proper supervision, training, and 
continuity of employment." 34 Pa. Code § 83.5(b)(7). 
 
Apprentices must be individually registered with the Council. Such 
registration is effected by submitting apprenticeship agreements to the 
Council for approval. 34 Pa. Code § 83.3(b). An "apprenticeship 
agreement" is the agreement between the apprentice and his employer 
which contains the terms and conditions of the employment and training 
of the apprentice. 34 Pa. Code § 83.2. 
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International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers and the 
Foundation for Fair Contracting to prosecute it and other 
non-union contractors while ignoring the wage act 
violations of union contractors, thereby violating Ferguson's 
due process rights. Ferguson also claimed the Prevailing 
Wage Act was preempted by ERISA. Ferguson sought 
damages and injunctive relief that would have prohibited 
defendants from prosecuting their administrative action 
against it or interfering with its attempt to bid on public 
works contracts. 
 
Both parties moved for summary judgment. Abstaining 
on all but the ERISA preemption issue,4  the district court 
held the state prevailing wage and apprenticeship laws were 
preempted insofar as they require a minimum journeyman- 
to-apprentice ratio and may forbid the retroactive approval 




The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 1343. See Keystone Chapter, Associated 
Builders and Contractors, Inc, 37 F.3d at 953. We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1292(a)(1). 
 
We review summary judgment decisions under a plenary 
standard. See Waldron v. SL Indus., Inc., 56 F.3d 491, 496 
(3d Cir. 1995). We must apply the same test as the district 
court and therefore must view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the nonmovant and affirm only if"there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Waldron, 56 F.3d at 496. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The district court abstained under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 
(1971). 
 
5. On appeal, defendants challenge the district court's decision to not 
abstain from deciding Ferguson's ERISA preemption claim as well as the 
judgment of preemption. Ferguson challenges the district court's failure 
to hold the Prevailing Wage Act is entirely preempted by ERISA insofar 
as it applies to apprenticeship programs. 
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III. 
 
After oral argument, we took the case under advisement 
awaiting the Supreme Court decision in California Division 
of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction, 
N.A., Inc., 117 S. Ct. 832 (1997). Dillingham Construction 
employed apprentices on a California public works contract. 
The apprentices were enrolled in an apprenticeship 
program which did not receive state approval until after 
they started working. The Division of Apprenticeship 
Standards of the California Department of Industrial 
Relations issued a notice of noncompliance to Dillingham 
for violating California's prevailing wage law, and the 
county was ordered to withhold Dillingham's payments. 
Dillingham filed suit to prevent the state from interfering 
with its contract. It alleged ERISA preempted enforcement 
of the prevailing wage law because the law related to the 
apprenticeship program, which was an ERISA plan. 
 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Dillingham on 
the following issue: 
 
Did Congress intend, in enacting ERISA, to pre-empt 
states' traditional regulation of wages, apprenticeships, 
and state-funded public works construction when 
expressed in a state prevailing wage law that restricts 
contractors' payment of lower apprentice specific wages 
to apprentices duly registered in programs approved as 
meeting federal standards? 
 
Examining "the objectives of the ERISA statute," the Court 
found no preemption. Id. at 838. 
 
ERISA was enacted to provide uniform federal regulation 
of employee benefit plans. See Keystone Chapter, 
Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc., 37 F.3d at 954. 
To further this goal, ERISA preempts "any and all State 
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any 
employee benefit plan . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Ferguson 
contends Pennsylvania's apprenticeship scheme is 
preempted by ERISA because it "relates to" the Associated 
Builders and Contractors apprenticeship program, which is 
an "employee benefit plan" under ERISA. 6 A "law `relate[s] 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The term "employee benefit plan" includes "any plan, fund, or program 
which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by an 
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to' a covered employee benefit plan . . . `if it [1] has a 
connection with or [2] reference to such a plan.' " 
Dillingham, 117 S. Ct. at 837 (quoting District of Columbia 
v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 129 
(1992)). 
 
A law has a "connection with" ERISA plans if it dictates 
the choices faced by ERISA plans. It is not enough if the 
law merely provides economic incentives to ERISA plans 
but does not "bind [them] to anything." Dillingham, 117 S. 
Ct. at 841. The apprenticeship scheme in Pennsylvania 
does not bind ERISA plans to anything, but merely provides 
economic incentives to encourage apprenticeship programs 
to obtain state approval. In Pennsylvania, as in California, 
"[i]f a contractor chooses to hire apprentices for a public 
works project, it need not hire them from an approved 
program (although if it does not, it must pay these 
apprentices journeyman wages)." Id. Like California's 
program, Pennsylvania's apprenticeship scheme does not 
have a "connection with" ERISA. See id. at 842 ("We could 
not hold preempted a state law in an area of traditional 
state regulation based on so tenuous a relation without 
doing grave violence to our presumption that Congress 
intended nothing of the sort."). 
 
Apprenticeship laws make "reference to" ERISA plans 
where "approved apprenticeship programs need . . . 
necessarily be ERISA plans." Id. at 838. Where 
apprenticeship laws are "indifferent to the funding, and 
attendant ERISA coverage, of apprenticeship programs," 
they do not make "reference to" ERISA plans. Id. at 839. In 
Dillingham, the Court held California's prevailing wage law 
and apprenticeship requirements did not make "reference 
to" ERISA plans because apprenticeship programs need not 
necessarily be ERISA plans; apprenticeship programs could 
be maintained by a single employer and their costs could 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that 
such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the 
purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries . . . 
apprenticeship or other training programs . . . ." 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1002(1),(3) (emphasis added). It is uncontested that the Associated 
Builders and Contractors apprenticeship program is an ERISA plan. 
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be defrayed out of the employers' general assets."Benefits 
paid out of an employer's general assets present[ ] risks 
indistinguishable from `the danger of defeated expectations 
of wages for services performed,' a hazard with which 
ERISA is unconcerned." Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. 
Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115 (1989)). 
 
Similarly, in Pennsylvania, an apprenticeship program 
may be approved regardless of its funding source and 
whether it is maintained by a single employer. See 34 Pa. 
Code § 83.2 (allowing a "person, association, committee, or 
organization" to "sponsor" an apprenticeship program); 
§ 83.5 (setting standards for apprenticeship programs 
without limiting the acceptable funding sources or 
sponsors). Like California's prevailing wage law, 
Pennsylvania's apprenticeship scheme does not make 




ERISA does not preempt Pennsylvania's prevailing wage 
and apprenticeship requirements insofar as they restrict 
the payment of apprentice wages to apprentices registered 
in approved programs. It is immaterial that the 
apprenticeship program in this case, the Associated 
Builders and Contractors program, is an ERISA plan. The 
apprenticeship program's choices were not dictated by 
Pennsylvania law. For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse 
the judgment of the district court and direct the district 
court to enter judgment in favor of defendants.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Ferguson contends this case is distinguishable from Dillingham 
because the latter "hinged on the fact that California's apprenticeship 
standards were `substantially similar' to [federal apprenticeship 
standards]." But the Court only mentioned the similarity in passing in a 
footnote and declined to resolve the issue of whether "uniformity of 
substantive standards" is even possible. Dillingham, 117 S. Ct. at 842 
n.10. More importantly, the laws in California and Pennsylvania do not 
materially differ in any way relevant to this issue. In both states, the 
"apprenticeship standards are not mandatory." Id. 
8. The district court reached Ferguson's preemption claim only after 
denying defendants' motion to abstain. Defendants originally appealed 
the abstention decision but did not brief the issue in their supplemental 
briefs submitted after the Dillingham decision. As we are ruling in 
defendants' favor, we see no reason to address the abstention issue. 
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